John Birchall - Economist.com

(Pan African Network of Emerging Leaders) is an international group of young African leaders who have participated in and been inspired by the British Council's Inter Action programme. A PANeL representative from each of the 19 participating countries has been elected and will inform Inter Action participants of events and meetings taking place in their particular country. If you are not sure who your PANEL representative is, please contact your British Council coordinator

PANeL - an overview
Raymond Gomis
24 Aug 2006

PANeL is an international action orientated organisation originated from a powerful interaction conversation journey during the Pan African Event in Nairobi, Kenya on the 5^th April 2005 and built during the Dakar meeting in Sénégal from the 22^nd - 25^th March 2006.

The aim of PANeL is to celebrate and honour the whole Inter Action Leadership Programme successful process in order to contribute significantly to Africa's Development through personal transformation and impacts on communities and organisations.

PANeL is established within 19 countries of Africa in the Sub Saharian. PANeL's members come from different social, economics and cultural backgrounds. They promote, value and respect diversity and differences within individuals, communities and organisations; building on what is working and living in a daily base their guiding 6, 7, 8 philosophy expressed in our 6 Passions, 7 Principles and 8 Assumptions of Appreciative Inquiry.

Members of PANeL are open to learning and open-minded, curious and willing to share their own experiences, skills and knowledge and have a strong desire to make significant contributions to society and are actively seeking for new perspectives.

VISION

An Africa with responsible, committed and accountable people who are collaborating to promote unity, peace, social justice, sustainable development and a better life for all

MISSION

To engender leadership in Africa that thinks and acts differently about gender, age and community through self-transformation, appreciating and working with differences as well as building on and honouring our successes

OBJECTIVES

To strengthen and expand the network of leaders at national and Pan African level so as to encourage ownership and sustainability of our principles, passions and assumptions of Appreciative Inquiry.
To reinforce leadership through training and empowerment of our communities.
To contribute to building a culture of good governance and social justice through powerful conversations.
To partner with other national, Pan African & international initiatives that are committed to the advancement of leadership

Why not test your knowledge of Africa?

Go to:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6100070.stm

and see how many questions you get right.

Are we entering a new nuclear age?

For most of the years since the Second World War ended in Europe in 1945 and elsewhere in 1946 the worries surrounding the nuclear capability of certain nations leading to war were firmly based on the behaviour of the USA and the former Soviet Union. Israel probably has possessed a nuclear deterrent since the 1960’s but it has always been reluctant to admit to this and its near neighbours invaded in both 1967 and 1973 confident that Tel Aviv would not order the use of atomic weapons.

As the last century closed we watched as both India and Pakistan entered the nuclear league. More recently the Korean peninsular has witnessed nuclear tests by North Korea and now this part of the globe has to examine how its lives with an unstable neighbour capable of atomic reactions.

However, it is perhaps another region that should concern us more – for the Middle East now has more than one nuclear power. Iran has been moving towards being able to construct and eventually test an atomic device.

The fear that Israel may be attacked by an Arab nation that has a nuclear capability is not the only fear now being assessed in the region: those who monitor the Middle East are concerned that Shiite Iran may just decide to put pressure on Sunni Saudi Arabia and so there exists the possibility that a nuclear race will begin within the Arab world. This may not be as remote as some observers think for in Iraq the Sunnis extremists have labelled the Shiite groups as infidels and are now killing innocent civilians just because they are Shiites. In turn Shiites are seeking revenge against Sunnis and a vicious cycle of retribution has begun. If Iran does get a bomb then its neighbours will probably want one for themselves. Saudi Arabia will not want to trust its defence to the US nuclear shield and will want to arm itself against any possible threat of atomic attack. Once Riyadh commissions the work needed to produce a nuclear device the Egyptians will also want to enhance their defence capabilities. Indeed, Gamal Mubarak, the son of the President has already called for his country to have such a capability. With legitimate states considering a move to nuclear capability the risk of extremists acquiring such technical know how increases and the region would become even more unstable. Some of the new nuclear powers might sell the necessary technology to other countries and so gain proxy allies. Hezbollah received medium-range rockets from Iran during the recent Lebanese crisis and by using an intermediary you reduce the risk of retaliation.

Another scenario that is being discussed is what happens if Saudi Arabia fragments and its nuclear capacity falls into the hands of those with sympathy for Osama bin Laden? Such proliferation may also arise if Al Qaeda bought such technology from a new member of the nuclear club? There are now nine members of this elite group and others have intensions to join.

When Pakistan first started its move to being a nuclear power few thought that such weapons would be used by one Islamic nation against another. But that was before Muslim killed Muslim in road-side and suicide bomb attacks. The latter has no tradition in Islam but its growing popularity removes some of the threat of deterrence as the bomber dies as part of the attack. The result of such attacks is death to innocent Muslims, who according to the logic of those carrying out such acts are involuntary martyrs. It is not a great stretch on the imagination to perceive of an Islamic organisation using a nuclear device against the Israelis and accepting massive retaliation by US and others as an example of fellow Muslims dying with God’s grace whilst others live on to fight to Holy War. Amongst some Islamic scholars there is now a growing debate as to whether nuclear weapons are permissible under the laws of the Koran. Their findings are published on the Internet and anyone can read them. The central thesis of such reports is that Islam is under attack and how are Muslim’s supposed to defend themselves against powers who have access to enormous arsenals of weapons. Many Muslims see themselves as suffering from military inferiority and some may decide that they too need arms that might go against the current interpretations of the Koran but will purchase the weapons in order to protect their faith. The jihadis now fighting in Iraq see the US as the murderer of hundreds of thousands of innocent Muslims and Bin Laden never talks of the ‘end’ as he sees the fight against the infidels as part of human earthly life.

One other factor needs to be analysed and that is a central feature of the Iranian Shiite interpretation of Islam. It is that they believe that a 12^th Imam is hidden awaiting the opportunity to return and his re-appearance will usher in a golden age followed by a Day of Judgement. It is worth noting that Mokata al-Sadr’s militia in Iraq is called Mahdi Army – the name Shiite’s give to the 12^th one.

We have to hope that Ahmadinejad understands the consequences of any use of nuclear weaponry in the region and that even the most extreme leaders of militia appreciate that any action suggesting a potential use of nuclear weapons will lead to an escalation of violence that will kill millions of their fellow believers.

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The non-nuclear proliferation treaty

It is worth noting that India, Pakistan and Israel have NOT signed this treaty and North Korea withdrew from it. A total of 188 nations have signed the treaty.

Five countries have the legal authority to keep an arsenal of nuclear weapons – USA, Russia, France, United Kingdom and China. India and Pakistan have moved into the ‘nuclear age’ and it is widely accepted that Israel has a nuclear capacity.

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

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